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ANALYZING DOMINO EFFECTS OCCURRING ON GASOLINE STORAGE TANKS  
AT THE BULK OIL STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION (BOST) DEPOT
Abstract. Since processed crude oil products are very vulnerable (susceptible) and highly flammable to cause massive catastro-
phes, such as fire and explosion, which are frequent and can create a chain reaction (Domino effects). This research was carried 
out at the Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation LTD depot on the Accra plain in Ghana where gasoline and Gasoil are stored. The 
research was conducted on a flammable gasoline area subjected to a vapor cloud explosion and the hazardous zone. Analyzing 
domino effects, propagation of a gasoline flammable vapor cloud caused by the explosion, ALOHA (Areal Location of Hazardous 
Atmospheres) software was used to find out how to apply effective safety measures to prevent future risks at any BOST facilities 
across the country. After the analysis, it was realized that 5.0 miles to the west-south-west the fuel concentration in the air was 
2100 ppm lower than the explosive limit (LEL), and could not be as severe as that at 2.3 miles distance from the source point 
(12600 ppm LEL) with a greater fuel concentration in the atmosphere. The results made available would be useful in maximizing 
(improving) safety at the facility, residential area, and as well as minimizing future incidents.
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АНАЛИЗ ЭФФЕКТОВ ДОМИНО, ВОЗНИКАЮЩИХ В РЕЗЕРВУАРАХ ДЛЯ ХРАНЕНИЯ БЕНЗИНА  
НА СКЛАДЕ ХРАНЕНИЯ И ТРАНСПОРТИРОВКИ НЕФТЕПРОДУКТОВ
Аннотация. Переработанные сырые нефтепродукты очень уязвимы (восприимчивы) и легко воспламеняются, что 
может вызвать массовые катастрофы, такие как пожары и взрывы, они случаются часто и могут вызвать цепную ре-
акцию (эффект домино). Это исследование было проведено на складе компании Bulk Oil Storage and Transportation 
LTD на равнине Аккра в Гане, где хранятся бензин и дизельное топливо. Исследование проводилось на подвергшемся 
взрыву парового облака участке с легковоспламеняющимся бензином и на опасной зоне. Для анализа эффекта домино 
от распространения вызванного взрывом облака горючих паров бензина было использовано программное обеспечение 
ALOHA (Areal Location of Hazardous Atmospheres), чтобы выяснить, как применять эффективные меры безопасности 
для предотвращения будущих рисков на любых объектах BOST по всей стране. После анализа было установлено, что 
в 5,0 мили к западу-юго-западу концентрация топлива в воздухе была на 2100 ppm ниже предела взрываемости (LEL) 
и не могла быть такой сильной, как на расстоянии 2,3 мили от исходной точки (12600 ppm LEL) с большей концентраци-
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1. Introduction
The consumption of energy has been increasing over 
the years as a result of both economic and infrastructural 
development around the world [1]. The chemical indus-
try affords a variety of advanced materials used in our daily 
life. However, these chemicals have explosive, corrosive 
and even toxic properties both in their raw and finished 
forms [2]. Large storage of such chemicals in highly popu-
lated areas pose risks, hence the need for a risk assessment 
to help prevent or mitigate any misfortune is urgent [3]. 
The research made indicates that major accidents on stor-
age farms are usually as a result of leakages from either 
process equipment, pipelines or auxiliary facilities [4]. 
Over the last decade experienced lots of explosions that 
resulted in several casualties and damage to properties [5]. 
This is not limited to Ghana alone, but it is a general 
problem worldwide. For example, there was a fire and ex-
plosion at the refinery of BP Products in North America, 
in Texas City in 2005, which claimed 15 lives and caused 
more than 170 injuries [6]. Further we listed some oth-
er instances around the globe (Table 1).
There are several methodologies that can be used to 
simulate the spread of various fires, such as a crown (can-
opy) fire as in [7] or surface fire as in [8] as well as the tran-
sition between surface and crown fires in [9]. Likewise, 
there exist several software tools such as the FARSITE, 
FlamMap5 and FSPro that can be applied to predict the 
probability of occurrence and spread, based on histori-
cal records, weather conditions and the topology of the 
landscape [10]. There has been a lot of researches on 
accident modelling involving a single unit. There are, 
however, limited researches relating to domino effect ac-
cident modelling, due to their low frequency and comp- 
lexity [11]. A domino effect occurs when one incident trig-
gers a series of incidents. Reniers [12], Abdolhamidzadeh 
et al. [13] and Kamil et al. [14], provided several defini-
tions to that effect and they all concluded that an initial 
event (accident) was responsible for initiating the domino 
effect. They also agreed that escalation vectors (heat flux 
and overpressure) were the cause of the propagation of 
an initial accident to a higher order, depending on the in-
tensity of the escalation vectors.
ей топлива в атмосфере. Полученные результаты будут полезны для максимизации (повышения) безопасности на объ-
екте, в жилом районе, а также для минимизации будущих инцидентов.
Ключевые слова: эффект домино, анализ риска, легковоспламеняющийся, взрыв, опасность, нижний предел взрыво-
опасности (НПВ)
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Table 1 
Major storage facilities accidents
Date and place Type of accident 
(problem)
Description of the accident 
and its causes
Emergency 
scale, the max 
damage zone 





Leakeage and fire Unit Fire; an atmospheric 
distillation column with hot 
diesel like material leaked 
and caught fire
Fire, toxic gas at 
the refinery
More than 15,000 peo-






Leakage and fire One unit tank leaked and 
fire spread to the other two
Massive blaze 
at a fuel storage 
facility
Three people were 
killed, and many 
were injured. One 
worker was fatally 






Fire explosion Fire ignition near a main-
tenance tank; engulfed in 











Fire explosion One unit tank contain-
ing gasoline caught fire 
and seven others with gas, 




Schools and residents 




Fire explosion Fire ignition near a main-
tenance tank, spread into 
three other giant tanks con-
taining crude oil
Fire, explo-
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This study uses the ALOHA (Areal Locations of 
Hazardous Atmosphere) hazard modeling tool to sim-
ulate the potential impact an accident at the Bulk Oil 
Storage and Transportation Co Ltd. Ghana’s (BOST) fa-
cility located on the Accra plains in Ghana may have on 
lives and properties. The ALOHA software is a widely ac-
cepted tool used for risk assessment [15, 16]. Renjith and 
Madhu [17] used it to estimate the individual and societal 
risk of the ammonia gas. The obtained results in this pa-
per are expected to help the company to evaluate the risks 
associated with the siting of the oil farm. It can also serve 
as a reference for policy and decision makers in the field 
for predicting industrial risks in the country.
Overview
In December 1993, the Bulk Oil Storage and 
Transportation Co Ltd (BOST) became a private lim-
ited liability company, with the Government of Ghana 
being a sole shareholder tasked with the distribution of 
processed petroleum products from its storage facili-
ties located in all parts of Ghana. Furthermore, BOST 
also holds the Natural Gas Transmission Utility License 
granted to it by the Ghana Energy Commission (EC) on 
December 19th, 2012. The NGTU as per (by) EC Act 
541, 1997, [18] will provide transmission and intercon-
nection services for natural gas without discrimination 
throughout the country. Transmission license is:
•	 to monitor and control the operation of the na-
tional interconnected network for the transmis-
sion of natural gas in areas within the country 
and to ensure the safe, reliable and economical 
transportation of natural gas facilities connected 
to the transmission system;
•	 to provide transmission interconnection services 
without discrimination to other licensees in the 
natural gas industry;
•	 to provide transmission interconnection services 
to operators of natural gas networks in ECOWAS 
member states.
Having critical responsibilities in the natural gas sec-
tor, based on the abovementioned, BOST will plan and 
develop the transmission system to meet national demand, 
operate non-discrimination open access transmission sys-
tem, set up codes and standards for pipeline access, main-
tain national demand-supply balance, ensure safe, reliable, 
economic dispatch and operation of NGTU (Natural Gas 
Transmission Utilities) system. The company will ensure 
compliance with codes and standards for pipeline access. 
BOST included building the internal natural gas market to 
speed up the transfer and distribution. The company has 
a vast pipeline and storage infrastructure located in the 
country. These are Accra Plains, Mami-Water, Akosombo, 
Kumasi Buipe and Bolgataga Depots.
1. Materials and Methodology
This section presents the data and methodology 
used in the analysis. The ALOHA software was used in 
the analysis. The site selected for the study is the BOST 
depot on the Accra plains in Ghana.
This research is based on the ALOHA software pro-
gram for analyzing the probability spread of fire explo-
sion (domino effect) from the source (gasoline storage 
tank) on the Accra plains [19, 20]. Now explosion into 
the same explosive charge (nearby tanks) can have a cru-
cial impact on the yield factor. A probability of the out-
come can be explained below:








where P(Aj) is an outcome probability, P(Bi) is a stage 
probability leading to the outcome, N is the number of 
stages leading to the outcome.
The domino effect principle is applied to this to ana-
lyze the probability of fire spread and damages if the 
source tank explodes in the path and wind direction in 
Fig. 5. For better understanding a potential scenario at 
the BOST Ghana gasoline storage tank on the Accra 
plains is given below, it has (is presented by) four series 
by Cozzani and coauthors [21].
In accordance with the Primary accident scenario the 
domino effects are initiated; dispension is related to the 
earlier event. The primary scenario and results lead to 
damages to secondary facilities and systematically go into 
several facilities, which rapidly results in the increase 
(boosting) of the domino effect in connection with the 
first scenario [22].
A similar situation took place at the Accra atomic 
junction. The accident caused many deaths and de-
stroyed properties. The consequences could explain 
boosting the domino effects in the scenario described 
above. Concerning the case study, a similar potential 
event might occur, so that internal and external domino 
effect will have considerable effects on several establish-
ments and the residential area as well. The first domino 
effect accident happened and documented in Texas city. 
A ship carrying ammonium nitrate exploded, this result-
ed from a chain of effects, affecting other ships and the 
crude oil storage near the port causing its explosion, thus 
killing 600 people and even more [23, 24].
1.1. Environmental analysis and data collection
The environmental data of Tema in Accra, including 
temperature, wind speed, atmospheric stability, relative hu-
midity, and cloud cover was used. The chemical tank loca-
tion and chemical data were also taken into consideration. 
A L O H A
ALOHA is an integrated risk analysis model program 
used in analyzing impacts of accidents, create a threat 
zone for various types of hazard. These simulations pro-
vide information on effective prevention measures and 
treatment for hazards and casualties; information is de-
signed to be used by safety officers and rescue responders. 
It has google earth integration for the effective visualiza-
tion after hazard occurrence [25].
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Wave pressure and radiation can be determined after 
the flammable substance is released to the atmosphere by 
the source ignition [26]. Fire explosion in storage com-
plexes and refinery industry account for 85 % of accidents 
and damage. The rest are related to spillage and toxic gas 
release, respectively. Property damage is difficult to ac-
count. Table 1 shows related accidents from different 
locations.
1.2. Case study
The industry this research is related to is the bulk oil 
storage and transportation Co Ltd (BOST) in Ghana, one 
of their storage facilities is located in Accra plains and is 
the largest of all the facilities they have. It has a total ca-
pacity of 210,500 cubic meters, Gasoline of 125,000 cubic 
meters, Gasoil of 90,000 cubic meters and the terminal 
has 15 tanks in all, 12 of which are operational. The facil-
ity is too close to the residential area, with the run on the 
google map elevation of 34 m, 4.25 km east and 1.48 km 
north. In this existing facility, the stakes are extremely 
high; therefore, safety must be paramount importance in 
daily operations. It is essential to use appropriate meth-
ods to identify a potential or probable incident that might 
occur [32]. In this situation, severity and likelihood of 
any hazard occurrence are implied, identifying risk ac-
tivities [17]. Hazard identification deals with collecting 
and identifying risks and most technical monitoring that 
can specify any danger in the workplace or surround-
ing; these duties are performed by a qualified safety 
consultant or safety engineer in the industry premises, 
thereby investigating the higher potential risk and haz-
ard quantifying (quantitative risk assessment) is termed 
Risk Assessment [33, 34]. Hazard operability and dom-
ino effects can be one of the best tools to identify risk. 
This research is focused on such risks like fire explosion, 
hazardous substances, toxicity effects as well as conse-
quences of the discharge of this substance at industrial 
facilities which would be determined for potential danger 
further in the paper.
T h e  p o t e n t i a l  s c e n a r i o  f o r  B O S T  
f a c i l i t y  m o d e l i n g  o n  t h e  A c c r a  
p l a i n s
Gasoline and Gasoil storage tanks, at the Accra plains 
depot include of 15 tanks, 12 of which are operational. 
Before this project, data was collected. The data provides 
the following: the tank properties, such as size, type of 
the chemical in the tank, thickness, etc., it makes refer-
ence to the library and Internet resources, and operation 
of reservoirs. Climate data was obtained from Internet 
weather reference site and was used, taking the average of 
humidity, temperature and wind speed for six months of 
the year. The Landscape and potential explosion hazards 
associated with this scenario were studied. All the factors 
above were analyzed using ALOHA software, the results 
of the analysis are given. We prepared actions against the 
potential threat and the domino effect that might hap-
pen in the study area. However, the consequences of the 
steps taken are also provided.
 initial fire secondary fire fireball / expanding fire 
Fig. 1. Stages of fire explosion [26] 
 
Spark from GOIL 
LNG station 
Spread to Total 
petrol station 
Supermarket, cars explode 
Explosion waves 
Fireball 
Fig. 2. Domino effects Stages during the Accra Atomic junction accident in Ghana [26] 
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ALOHA software’s methodology is to create an event 
scenario and collect data for this scenario, using a real 
example of the location of this event, which can be repre-
sented in the following steps:
•	 scenario;
•	 data entry of the area for modeling;
•	 atmospheric data;
•	 chemical data.
Scenario — in this situation, the gasoline is stored in 
the reservoir and the latter is considered from the per-
spective of the potential explosion and its related risks 
and hazards (Fig. 3).
 
Fig. 3. BOST tank farm depot location.
Red (1) — ALOHA source Point, Blue (2) — residential área,  
Green (3) — gas oil tanks 
In addition, the situation is modeled in the following 
conditions.
 
Fig. 4. Wind rose Tema, Ghana [35] 
Table 2 explains and provides the atmospheric pa-




Wind Speed 12 Miles per hour
Wind Direction Two at WSW meters
Ground Roughness Open country –
Air Temperature 27 oC
Inversion Height No –
Cloud Cover 3 tenths
Stability Class D –
Relative Humidity 25  %
Table 3 gives information concerning the location 
of the tank storage on the Accra plain of the Bulk Oil 




Location Latitude Longitude Altitude
Accra plains 
depot 
5o39’N 0o01’E 12 m
Table 4 gives the properties and data of gasoline (pet-
rol chemical) information for the study.
Table 5 gives the information about tanks and related 
tanks near the scenario, gasoline tank that was consid-
ered in this research.
2. Results and Discussions
The possible accident that might happen according to 
the run data, explosion of the flammable gasoline area 
of the vapor cloud. From the source atmospheric storage 
tanks we got the output explosion results that could also 
affect the nearby tanks that contain gasoil and gasoline. 
The gasoline flammable area of the vapor cloud explo-
sion given below in Table 6.
Concerning this potential scenario, any part of the 
flammable area of the vapor cloud explosion that would 
be above 2100 ppm can result in an explosion. Because 
gasoline, and oxygen are mixed in the atmosphere. 
Furthermore, the danger zone or threat zone increase 
depending on the severity of the explosion wave at each 
level, this is divided into two stages from the ALOHA 
source point, as it is shown in Fig. 5.
The gravity of the wave caused by the explosion of 
the flammable gasoline area of vapor cloud explosion is 
shown in the red zone (1), which covers a distance of 
2.3 miles from the direction of the wind in the BOST de-
pot to the west-south-west at Accra plains and which is 
more significant at 12600 ppm (60 % LEL = flame pock-
ets).
The yellow marked area (2) is the one where the in-
tensity flammable area of the vapor cloud explosion re-
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from the ALOHA source point downwind of the depot to 





Fig. 5. Flammable threat zone: 
a — graph, b — google map 
In the scenario, according to Fig. 5, any red area cov-
erage is a flammable area of the vapor cloud explosion 
greater than 60 % LEL, that would explode and get fire 
with a series of damages. Hence, modeling a flamma-
ble gasoline area of a vapor cloud explosion shows the 
threshold concentration of fuel in the air, when a flam-
mability hazard may exist, which is shown by the red and 
yellow areas on the map and the graph. It is also shown 
that the red and yellow are the gasoline concentration va-
por in the atmosphere, hence any contact with ignition 
or a spark would result in fire explosion because it has 
the mixture of air and fuel to start burning. For quantita-
tive risk assessment of fuel vapor mix with air flamma-
ble greater than 12600 ppm, structures and heavy losses 
would be incurred (domino effect) in series. The results 
obtained from ALOHA indicate the nearby reservoir in 
669 meters to the west would also be affected, result-
ing in a massive explosion if the source tank explodes, 
which will moun (cause) a considerable damage (from 
the coverage area in Fig. 5, b. Risk analysis within risk 
assessment is straightforward in contrast with a quantita-
tive risk assessment which takes the starting screen of a 
Domino effect propagation, then QRA, which needs im-
puting limited data [36].
Safety guidelines and prevention
Keeping this in mind, gasoline storage in Accra is lim-
ited in order to meet the growing market at the southern 
border of Ghana. Many of such facilities are built close to 
residential areas, therefore the risk of toxicity, explosion, 
and fire hazard severity is going to double. Information 
regarding the safety of oil refinery companies, storage 
and transporting companies are strictly not adhered to. 
Recommendations to reduce future accident related to 
fire, explosion, toxicity risks are given below:




























Tank model Season Number of 
tanks
70 % 24,937,962 Gasoline — 
Liquid 
25 oC 42 m 18 m Cylinder Warm 4
64 % 24,937,962 Gasoil — Liquid 27 oC 42 m 18 m Cylinder Warm 3
Table 6 
Results of the potential scenario for the flammable gasoline area of vapor cloud explosion
Parameter Threat zone distance LEL Flame surface
Yellow 5.0 miles 2100 ppm = 10 % Limiting Oxidant 
Concentration
Red 2.3 miles 12600 ppm = 60 % Flame pockets
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•	 use of safety signs in a high-risk location;
•	 use of fire alarm and amplified alarm;
•	 application of heat sensors and smoke detectors, 
fire detectors around the tank area and loading 
bay;
•	 adopting the passive defense, this is very effective 
against all kinds of risk (it consists of good urban 
plan and an architecture design of the facility, 
which can reduce any natural and human-made 
threat concerning this type of scenarios [37]);
•	 construction projects must consider quick evacu-
ation and avoid being located close to a residen-
tial area;
•	 in the process of designing reservoirs safe res-
ervoir radius must be taken into consideration 
[38, 39];
•	 regular inspection and identification of potential 
faults of ignition are of paramount importance;
•	 emergency radio phone should be available to 
workers and security officials;
•	 the authors [40] suggested a software tool called 
to determine the domino impacts (in the order of 
priority) at an industrial plant, on one or several 
levels on the site.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In this research, Domino effects are shown to be very 
challenging, this applies to models and estimates of 
probability, data spread, and complexities of the analy-
sis carried out and is still substantial [39]. People are 
well aware of the risks but do not systematically mitigate 
them. According to the scenario and the concerning 
the BOST facility (ALOHA source point), the accident 
caused the human fatality and damage (the flammable 
area of the vapor cloud explosion) within a high range of 
2.3 miles of 12600 ppm in a flame pocket.
Furthermore, downwind property loss is estimated 
greater than 12600 ppm in modeling Fig. 5, This study 
gives precise results for ensuring safety for the person-
nel on the self-assessment, and carrying out a safe zone 
which would be a border of 4.0 miles, separating residents 
from the industrial facility. Domino effect occurrence 
can be mitigated or curtailed; flammable tanks should 
widely be separated from each other.
Moreover, tank vehicles for filling should be kept at an 
appropriate safety distance to reduce the possible dam-
ages and fatality. The study also provides a comparison 
between previous events and future event that might oc-
cur accompanied by a domino effect and consequences 
relating to the BOST facility, including the Accra plain, 
Kumasi and the northern part of Ghana [41, 42]. For us to 
reach the practical result, two or more modeling program 
should be considered and run for better comparison and 
concrete outcomes: such software program as FLACS 
[43], SAFETI — DNV GL [44], and TOXI+Risk [45].
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